Organization of public safety networks: Spillovers, interoperability, and participation

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dc.contributor.authorLiu, Yipeng
dc.contributor.authorGuo, Hong
dc.contributor.authorNault, Barrie
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-23T16:16:14Z
dc.date.available2020-01-23T16:16:14Z
dc.date.issued2016-09-14
dc.description.abstractWe analyze trade‐offs in the organization of public safety networks when network assets are distributed across districts and a district values network assets in its own and other districts. Comparing centralized, decentralized, and mixed organization forms, we capture two critical properties: interoperability among distributed technology‐based network assets and the ability of districts to opt‐in or opt‐out of the centralized form. We model the provision of public safety networks, where network assets are chosen by each district or by a federal government, where these assets have a positive cross‐district spillover that depends on interoperability, where investments in effort can be made to improve interoperability, and where districts can opt‐in or opt‐out of centralized provision. With the adoption of centralized, decentralized, or mixed provision as a result of districts' opt‐in or opt‐out choices, we identify conditions that determine when the districts deviate from the social optimum and thus regulatory intervention is beneficial to incent the socially optimal organization form. We show how the socially optimal organization form can be achieved through policy instruments such as a sharing rule for the cost of interoperability effort and direct government grants.en_US
dc.identifier.citationLiu, Y., Guo, H., & Nault, B. R. (2016). Organization of Public Safety Networks: Spillovers, Interoperability, and Participation. Production and Operations Management, 26(4), 704–723. doi:10.1111/poms.12655en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12655en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/111547
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/43877
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.publisher.facultyHaskayne School of Businessen_US
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Calgaryen_US
dc.publisher.policyhttps://authorservices.wiley.com/author-resources/Journal-Authors/licensing/self-archiving.htmlen_US
dc.rightsUnless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.en_US
dc.subjectcentralizationen_US
dc.subjectdecentralizationen_US
dc.subjectinteroperabilityen_US
dc.subjectpublic safety networksen_US
dc.subjectfirst-neten_US
dc.titleOrganization of public safety networks: Spillovers, interoperability, and participationen_US
dc.typejournal articleen_US
dc.typeacceptedVersionen_US
dc.typejournal articleen_US
dc.typeacceptedVersionen_US
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrueen_US
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