A Negotiation Game: Establishing Stable Privacy Policies for Aggregate Reasoning
Date
2012-10-31T14:47:10Z
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Abstract
The process of personal information collection and exchange
is associated with ever-growing privacy concerns. To resolve the issue,
data provider's consent on the usage of private information is sought
through privacy policy speci cations. The parameters of such privacy
policies in
uence the quantity and quality of gathered information. Choosing
the right privacy policy parameters can potentially increase the revenues
to a data collector and the rms (third-parties) interested in accessing
the database for data analysis purposes. In this work we use an
extensive form game model to examine the decisions made by a data
collector and a third-party to maximize their bene ts from collecting
and accessing data. We have found the game's subgame perfect equilibria
for various problem settings and provide the details of game analysis
for a simpli ed scenario and two case studies. The equilibrium solutions
demonstrate steady states of the game where collecting personal information
at a speci c privacy level is advantageous to the data collector
and the third-party. Consequently the results de ne a realistic boundary
on collecting personal information.
Description
Keywords
Game Theory, Data Privacy