IAEA safeguards after Iraq
Date
1996
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Abstract
While remaining a party to the NPT and a member in "good standing" in the IAEA, Iraq proved that a non-nuclear weapon state could pursue a nuclear weapons programme by co-locating undeclared nuclear activities at declared sites and by locating clandestine nuclear activities at undeclared sites. This shook the confidence of the international community in the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards system. Consequently, the IAEA embarked on the "93+2" programme with the goal of improving its ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities. The reform proposals, particularly the environmental sampling techniques and the proliferation critical pathways analysis, significantly strengthen its ability to detect diversions of nuclear material and to expose co-located undeclared nuclear activities. Debate amongst its member states over sovereignty and security concerns has, however, eroded the broad access and increased information provisions that would have better enabled the IAEA to expose nuclear activities at undeclared sites.
Description
Bibliography: p. 148-152.
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Citation
Cameron, J. K. (1996). IAEA safeguards after Iraq (Master's thesis, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada). Retrieved from https://prism.ucalgary.ca. doi:10.11575/PRISM/23419