Indeterministic Choice and Ability
Date
2018-04-27
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer
Abstract
The problem of luck is advanced and defended against libertarian theories of responsibility-enabling ability. An outline of an account of ability is articulated to explore some features of the sort of ability moral responsibility requires. The account vindicates the luck objection and suggests a novel puzzle: Libertarianism is structurally barred from answering the problem of luck because responsibility requires, but inherently lacks, an explanation from reason states to actions that preserves reliability of connection between responsibility-grounding reasons-sensitivity and action.
Description
Keywords
Indeterministic choice, Luck objection, Modest libertarianism, Reliable ability
Citation
Haji, I., & Hebert, R. (2018). Indeterministic Choice and Ability. The Journal of Ethics, 1-13.