Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse

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dc.contributor.authorLenart, Bartlomiej A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-20T17:54:23Z
dc.date.available2020-04-20T17:54:23Z
dc.date.issued2019-03-08
dc.description.abstractDavid Lewis cautions that although a no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics entails immortality for trans-world selves, the nature of the branching leaves us crippled, lonely, deathly ill (although never dead), and mentally infirm, meaning that immortal life, on such terms, amounts to an existence in eternal torment. This paper argues that the problem Lewis points to is in fact one of individuation and that a synthesis of Lewis’ own notion of perdurance and Robert Nozick’s closest continuer theory, when cast in the mould of a deterministic multiverse (as conceived by the Oxford quantum physicist David Deutsch), individuates trans-world selves in such a way as to allow to prune the infinitesimal expectation of a miserable eternal existence from the histories of most trans-world agents. Thus, contrary to Lewis’ warning that if personal identity is a trans-world notion, then we should all shake in our shoes, this paper argues that even if we are trans-world selves, we almost certainly have nothing to worry about.en_US
dc.identifier.citationLenart, B. A. (2019). Why We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverse. "Metaphysica" 2019; 20(1): 117-136. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2006en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2019-2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/111815
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/43678
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDe Gruyteren_US
dc.publisher.facultyLibraries and Cultural Resourcesen_US
dc.publisher.hasversionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rightsUnless otherwise indicated, this material is protected by copyright and has been made available with authorization from the copyright owner. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission.en_US
dc.subjectpersonal identity, diachronic identity, trans-world identity, multiverseen_US
dc.titleWhy We Shouldn’t Pity Schrödinger’s Kitty: Revisiting David Lewis’ Worry About Quantum Immortality in a Branching Multiverseen_US
dc.typejournal articleen_US
ucalgary.item.requestcopytrueen_US
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