The impact of adjuster moral hazard on driving records

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dc.contributor.authorKleffner, Anneeng
dc.contributor.authorKelly, Maryeng
dc.contributor.authorIsotuba, Sapnaeng
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-16T17:18:15Z
dc.date.available2011-08-16T17:18:15Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.description© Society of Actuaries, Schaumburg, Illinois. Posted with permission granted August 5, 2011.eng
dc.description.abstractIn a first-party recovery scheme for automobile property damage, the first-party insurer compensates not-at-fault vehicular damage. In this scheme, adjusters may not have the incentive to assign liability when the driver is, in fact, at fault for the accident. This is due to adjusters not having to coordinate with a third-party adjuster, and, for insureds that carry collision coverage, the assignment of fault does not appreciably affect the compensation paid out. This in turn reduces the effectiveness of the experience-rating component of the insurance premium. Empirical evidence that supports the presence of incorrect fault assignment is provided. A stochastic model of experience rating analyzing the impact of incorrect fault assignment on driving record classes confirms that low-risk insureds pay more for insurance than if fault was correctly assigned.eng
dc.description.refereedYeseng
dc.identifier.citationMary Kelly, Sapna Isotuba and Anne Kleffner "The impact of adjuster moral hazard on driving records: North American Actuarial Journal 13: 425-437: 2009eng
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.11575/PRISM/34123
dc.identifier.issn1092-0277
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1880/48707
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherSociety of Actuarieseng
dc.publisher.corporateUniversity of Calgaryeng
dc.publisher.facultyHaskayne School of Businesseng
dc.publisher.urlhttp://www.soa.org/news-and-publications/publications/journals/naaj/naaj-detail.aspxeng
dc.subjectAutomobile insuranceeng
dc.subjectStochastic modelseng
dc.subject.otherInsurance claims adjustingeng
dc.subject.otherMoral hazardeng
dc.titleThe impact of adjuster moral hazard on driving recordseng
dc.typejournal article
thesis.degree.disciplineFinance Risk Management & Insuranceeng
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